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Hard and Soft Law in the Paris Climate Agreement
Abstract
This paper examines the effectiveness of contractual, facilitative, and hybrid legal models in international
climate agreements from the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) to the Paris Climate
Agreement (2015). It begins with a review of the balance between hard and soft treaty law in international
environmental treaties prior to the Paris Climate Agreement with an eye for how this translated into
effectiveness in terms of compelling states to lower greenhouse gas emissions. It then investigates the
structure and effectiveness of the Paris Climate Agreement, taking into account global political realities
and limitations for international environmental law. The product of this investigation is an argument in
favor of Paris’s hybrid model utilizing both soft and hard treaty law in order to prioritize participation while
maintaining an enforcement regime and state-level emissions-reduction obligations.
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Hard and Soft Law in the Paris Climate Agreement
Introduction
As environmental science becomes increasingly explicit and exigent in its assessment of
the threat of climate change, the international legal system has been challenged to adapt and
confront state-level carbon emissions. This evolution towards a system of international
institutions producing policy according to environmental developments has been described as
ecosystemic or ecological reflexivity, and it is an essential principle in producing an international
legal framework that can effectively combat the climate crisis.1 Ecological reflexivity consists of
recognition of environmental reality, rethinking the social relationship with the environment, and
responding to environmental changes through policy and the law.2 Any effective international
climate framework must be built on these principles, and because of the international challenge
posed by climate change, as many state actors must be involved as possible.
The drive to combat climate change within the international system has primarily taken
the form of treaty law as a means to compel states to construct domestic environmental policy.
This treaty regime has gradually developed into a hybrid legal system—including both hard and
soft law—to walk the fine line between enforcement, increasing obligations to reduce emissions,
and broadening international participation. A hybrid legal model attempts to solve a problem at
the heart of treaty effectiveness, which, according to Bodansky, is defined by “the stringency of
1

John S. Dryzek, “Institutions for the Anthropocene: Governance in a Changing Earth System,” British Journal of
Political Science 46, no. 4 (October 2016): 937–56, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123414000453.
2
Jonathan Pickering, “Ecological reflexivity: characterising an elusive virtue for governance in the Anthropocene,”
Environmental Politics 28, no. 7 (2019): 1145–1166, https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2018.1487148.

Hanson 2
its commitments, [...] the levels of participation, and compliance by states.”3 Effectiveness is
challenged by the conflict between stringency and participation because as stringency increases,
fewer states are willing to participate—and vice versa. There are two primary solutions to this
conflict: a contractual model and a facilitative model, which approach the use of hard and soft
law in opposing ways.4

History from the UNFCCC to Paris
International environmental law first addressed climate change in the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was negotiated in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil in 1992 and came into effect in 1994.5 The UNFCCC was established following the
negotiation of the Montreal Protocol in 1987, which was the first substantial international treaty
on the environment, though it did not focus on climate change (instead, it focused on the
depletion of the ozone layer).6 The UNFCCC’s main contribution to international environmental
law was that it acted as a foundation from which to negotiate the Kyoto Protocol, following the
1995 Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC in Berlin.7 Rather than establishing
binding (hard law) emissions standards and goals for states party, it sets an international
objective: the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that

3

Daniel Bodansky, “The Durban Platform: Issues and Options for a 2015 Agreement,” Center for Climate and
Energy Solutions (December 2012): 2, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2270336.
4
Ibid.
5
“What is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change?” United Nations Climate Change,
accessed April 25, 2021, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-convention/what-is-the-united-nationsframework-convention-on-climate-change.
6
“The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer,” U.S. Department of State, accessed April
25, 2021, https://www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-environmental-quality-and-transboundary-issues/
the-montreal-protocol-on-substances-that-deplete-the-ozone-layer/.
7
Jonathan Pickering, Jeffrey S. McGhee, Sylvia I. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, and Joseph Wenta, “Global Climate
Governance Between Hard and Soft Law: Can the Paris Agreement’s ‘Crème Brûlée’ Approach Enhance Ecological
Reflexivity?” Journal of Environmental Law 31, no. 1 (March 2019): 11, https://doi.org/10.1093/jel/eqy018.
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would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”8 Additionally, it
established the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities,” which played an important role in the delegation of obligations in the Kyoto
Protocol.9 In short, the UNFCCC acted as a “heavily qualified, non-binding quasi-target” for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.10
Following the widespread adoption of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 sought
to establish the first effective emissions-reducing regime.11 The Kyoto Protocol attempted to
accomplish this primarily by employing hard law through a contractual model, meaning that it
prioritized stringency and compliance at the cost of participation.12 It put the burden on
developed countries (“Annex I”) to reduce emissions and set clear mandates of obligation on
states party.13 This approach failed to incentivize “non-Annex I” states to reduce their emissions,
essentially letting some countries with high emissions off the hook, such as India and China.14
Furthermore, the lack of accountability for high emissions developing (non-Annex I) countries
dissuaded developed countries, such as the United States, from participating in the Kyoto
Protocol, as they believed it would unfairly restrict their industry in competition with developing
countries’ industries. 15 As a result of the Kyoto Protocol’s employment of the principle of
“common but differentiated responsibilities,” participation was low among both Annex I and

8

Ibid, 13; UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted May 9, 1992, entered into force March 21,
1994) 1771 UNTS 107 (UNFCCC), Article 2, 9 https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_
publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf.
9
UNFCCC, 2.
10
Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate Change Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017), 104.
11
Kayla Clark, “The Paris Agreement: Its Role in International Law and American Jurisprudence,” Notre Dame
Journal of International & Comparative Law 8, no. 2 (May 10, 2018): 109,
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1090&context=ndjicl.
12
Bodansky, “The Durban Platform,” 2.
13
Clark, “The Paris Agreement,” 110.
14
Alexandre Durand, “Common Responsibility: The Failure of Kyoto,” Harvard International Review 34, no. 1
(2012): 8–9, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1524709469/fulltext/D4A69A94C50E4160PQ/1?accountid=2694.
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Clark, “The Paris Agreement,” 111.
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non-Annex I states, lowering the effectiveness of the treaty’s stringent obligations as few
countries agreed to abide by them: according to Clark, “without China and India, and later the
United States, the treaty only accounted for thirty percent of global emissions.”16 Only 83 states
party ratified the Kyoto Protocol, in contrast to the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement’s 197 states
party.17
Moving past the failure of the Kyoto Protocol, global leaders directed their attention to
the annual COP meetings, established by the UNFCCC, as opportunities to pursue a more
effective climate treaty. The 2009 COP meeting in Copenhagen (COP 15) produced the
“Copenhagen Accord,” which, while failing to produce a formal treaty with numerous states
party, functioned as an understanding and basic agreement on emissions between China, India,
and the U.S.18 Copenhagen’s “pledge and review” model, which for the first time compelled
China and India to move beyond their status as non-Annex I countries under Kyoto and
participate in emissions reduction, was strengthened the following year at COP 16 in Cancún. 19
Agreements at the COP in Copenhagen and Cancún, learning from the failure of the Kyoto
Protocol, eliminated the Annex I/non-Annex I system, treating developing and developed
countries the same in the spirit of increasing participation across the board.20 Additionally,
Copenhagen/Cancún ended the utilization of contractual models in international climate treaties,
focusing instead on the potential of facilitative models, which are less stringent and prioritize
compliance and participation.21

16

Ibid.
Ibid, 112.
18
Ibid, 113.
19
Pickering, McGhee, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, and Wenta, “Global Climate Governance,” 12.
20
Clark, “The Paris Agreement,” 113.
21
Jeffrey McGhee and Jens Steffek, “The Copenhagen Turn in Global Climate Governance and the Contentious
History of Differentiation in International Law,” Journal of Environmental Law 28, no. 1 (March 2016): 37–63,
https://doi.org/10.1093/jel/eqw003.
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In 2011, the Durban Mandate was negotiated, setting the framework for a new
international climate treaty in the mold of the Kyoto Protocol, but with a facilitative model based
on soft law.22 Leading up to the Paris Climate Agreement, which the Durban Mandate preceded,
many European, African, and island nations argued for a legally binding treaty, predicated on
hard law, while some developing nations such as India countered by supporting a soft law
approach.23 This debate was limited by the political reality in the U.S., as any hard law-based
treaty would have to clear a two-thirds vote in the Senate—which was essentially impossible, as
Democrats were far short of a 67-vote majority.24 As such, a soft law or hybrid approach was
likely going into the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement negotiations.

The Paris Climate Agreement
The Paris Climate Agreement in its final form is the most effective piece of international
environmental treaty law in history, with near-universal state participation, a clear objective for
global emissions reductions, and a transparent reporting structure with nation-specific
environmental goals.25 Similar to the Kyoto Protocol’s hard law, Annex I/non-Annex I approach,
the Paris Climate Agreement has a hard law component in the form of its binding overall
objective and its requirement for countries to transparently report their adherence to the treaty’s
emissions mandates.26 The Paris Climate Agreement, however, broke from an entirely hard
law-based philosophy as it has a substantial soft law component: emissions targets by country are

22

Peter Lawrence and Daryl Wong, “Soft law in the Paris Climate Agreement: Strength or weakness?” Review of
European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 26, no. 3 (November 28, 2017): 278–9,
https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12210.
23
Ibid, 279.
24
Ibid.
25
Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted December 12, 2015,
entered into force November 4, 2016) (Paris Climate Agreement), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_
agreement.pdf.
26
Pickering, McGhee, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, and Wenta, “Global Climate Governance,” 12.
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not enforced, and the language in the treaty governing both the global climate objective and
individual countries’ required contributions toward that objective is sufficiently vague to
essentially leave it up to states party to uphold the treaty through their political will.27

Hard and Soft Law in Paris
Before the Paris Climate Agreement, international treaties and agreements had attempted
to establish a collective target in terms of an increase in global temperature that staying below
would prevent substantial long-term damage from climate change. The Kyoto Protocol could not
institute such a standard, aiming instead at the aggregate temperature rise based on the
contributions of individual states.28 The later Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was more
successful, establishing “an 18% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels by
2020.”29 The consequences of the failures of international climate agreements before Paris are
severe, particularly as a result of failing to establish a scientifically-based global temperature
objective: before the Copenhagen Agreement, and with only the Kyoto Protocol, global
temperatures may have risen 3.5–4.5℃ by 2100.30 Furthermore, by the beginning of the Paris
Climate Agreement negotiations in 2015, global temperatures were predicted to rise 2.6–3.1℃.31
The Paris Climate Agreement set the goal of “holding the increase in the global average
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would
significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.”32 Additionally, this language is
27

Ibid.
Joanna Depledge, “Tracing the Origins of the Kyoto Protocol: an Article-by-Article Textual History,” UNFCCC,
November 25, 2000, https://unfccc.int/documents/1880.
29
Pickering, McGhee, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, and Wenta, “Global Climate Governance,” 22.
30
Joeri Rogelj, et al. “Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep warming well below 2 °C,” Nature
534 (2016): 631–639, https://www.nature.com/articles/nature18307.pdf.
31
Ibid; Pickering, McGhee, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, and Wenta, “Global Climate Governance,” 17.
32
Paris Agreement, Article 2(1a).
28
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binding, as it is in the hard law portion of the agreement, meaning that all states party must be in
line with the overall objective of the treaty to some extent. This language is unique in
international climate law in that it is somewhat based on scientifically determined emissions
reduction goals; however, because of the political reality of mandating emissions reductions, it
falls slightly short of the threshold touted by most scientists.
Treaty hard law acts at a similar level to federal law in most countries, according to the
Vienna Convention on Treaties;33 this includes the U.S., even though it is not a state party to the
Vienna Convention, because the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that international law should be
treated as binding on domestic affairs.34 The binding nature of the global temperature rise goal
has manifested in state-level and localized judiciaries, where environmental interests now have
legal-grounding for litigation hoping to reduce emissions: “the [Paris] Agreement’s mitigation
framework, including the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), mid- and long-term
goals and the temperature targets, provides a policy and factual benchmark against which courts
are evaluating government or private sector actions.”35 As such, the Paris Climate Agreement has
been cited in state-level and localized litigation in countries including New Zealand, Ireland,
South Africa, Australia, Poland, the Netherlands, Colombia, Switzerland, and the U.S., with
many of these cases holding states to account for their adherence to their Paris obligations (or
lack thereof).36
The other portion of the treaty that is binding is the requirement for all states party to
establish “nationally determined contribution” (NDCs) defining mandated reductions in
33

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted May 23, 1969, entered into force January 27, 1980) 1155
UNTS 331 (Vienna Convention), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1980/01/19800127%2000-52%
20AM/Ch_XXIII_01.pdf.
34
Clark, “The Paris Agreement,” 125.
35
David Hunter, Wenhui Ji, and Jenna Ruddock, “The Paris Agreement and Global Climate Litigation after the
Trump Withdrawal,” Maryland Journal of International Law 34, no. 1 (2019): 225–6,
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol34/iss1/9.
36
Ibid, 229–240.
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emissions by country.37 The binding nature of the NDCs manifests in each country establishing
their own emissions goal and communicating their progress in achieving their goal; however,
states party are not bound to “meet the requirements of the NDC” that they set for themselves.38
Additionally, because states control their own goals, they also control the ambition of their goals,
and there is the potential (which has very much been realized) for dramatic disparities in how
closely states adhere to their NDCs in practice.39 This possible disparity reveals another problem
with NDCs: the system maintains to a limited extent the problem of differentiation in the Kyoto
Protocol by preserving the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.40 However,
this problem is much less exigent than it was during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, as the
binding portion of the NDCs heightens the obligations for developing countries towards an equal
responsibility with developed countries. The political issue has also slightly lessened since 1997,
with India and China more willing to shoulder their responsibility in global greenhouse gas
emissions reductions.
NDCs, because of their reliance on state initiative to be effective in the aggregate, have
the potential to fall short of the overall goals of the Paris Climate Agreement. In fact, the
“emissions gap” between current predictions for global temperature rise under Paris and
necessary global temperature rise in order to avoid the worst consequences of climate change is
currently startlingly high, with NDCs set to reduce emissions by only one-third of the requisite
amount.41
Finally, the review provisions of the Paris Climate Agreement are also binding, acting as
the primary enforcement and accountability mechanism. Article 13 of the Paris Climate
37

Paris Agreement, Article 4(2).
Lawrence and Wong, “Soft Law in the Paris Climate Agreement,” 280.
39
Pickering, McGhee, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, and Wenta, “Global Climate Governance,” 14.
40
Lawrence and Wong, “Soft Law in the Paris Climate Agreement,” 280.
41
Hunter, Ji, and Ruddock, “The Paris Agreement and Global Climate Litigation,” 227.
38
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Agreement institutes an “enhanced transparency framework,” built on mutual respect between
states parties, regardless of state NDCs.42 Article 14 sets a five-year timeframe for the COP to
convene, review states party adherence to their NDCs, and put state contributions in a global
context, in what the treaty calls a “global stocktake.”43 Article 15 consists of the primary
compliance-inducing mechanism: provisions for a committee to investigate and confront states
party failing to meet their NDCs, functioning “in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial
and non-punitive.”44 In short, the enforcement provisions for the Paris Climate Agreement are
fairly weak, relying on reputation costs and ‘naming and shaming,’ facilitated by a transparency
system that reveals and induces states to confront states that are not meeting their NDCs, to
ensure compliance.45

Effectiveness
Though the Paris Climate Agreement’s enforcement mechanisms may seem ineffective,
the treaty threads a difficult needle between soft law encouraging participation and hard law
emphasizing compliance. The substance of the treaty regarding emissions reductions is couched
in soft law, making it less effective than if states party had mandated contribution, as they did
under the Kyoto Protocol. That being said, the Paris Climate Agreement attracted significantly
more signatories than Kyoto because of the less stringent requirements.46 Because Paris also
included binding provisions regarding NDC procedure and transparency as an enforcement
mechanism, in the words of Pickering, McGhee, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, and Wenta, “a mix of
hard and soft provisions could boost participation without undermining other aspects of response
42

Paris Agreement, Article 13.
Ibid, Article 14.
44
Ibid, Article 15.
45
Lawrence and Wong, “Soft Law in the Paris Climate Agreement,” 284.
46
Pickering, McGhee, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, and Wenta, “Global Climate Governance,” 15.
43
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or rethinking.”47 This was accomplished without forfeiting the participation of the U.S., as the
limited nature of the binding provisions of Paris did not require Senate approval.
Another potential advantage of Paris’s hybrid approach is its ability to induce states party
to strengthen the treaty by implementing accompanying domestic climate legislation. This has
already happened in many countries, which have codified measures to meet their NDC in
domestic law. This has further enabled environmentalists to hold states to account for adhering to
their NDCs through domestic legal systems.48 Additionally, although current NDCs do not meet
the global temperature rise objectives established in Paris, there is a provision in the treaty that
ensures that states party cannot reduce their NDCs and can only increase them; pared with a
non-binding obligation to gradually increase contributions, this ensures that there will be a
gradual increase in contributions over time, eventually meeting the overall goals of Paris.49
Furthermore, ‘naming and shaming’ as an enforcement mechanism can be genuinely
effective, greatly influencing state behavior. Unlike prior international climate treaties, the Paris
Climate Agreement has a transparent system of reporting adherence to NDCs and state progress
in reducing emissions. This transparency greatly increases the cost of non-compliance, even in
failing to comply with the soft law portions of Paris: “the transparency and accountability
mechanism of the Paris Agreement could achieve the same result as binding obligations in that it
is more likely that ‘poor performance will be detected and criticized’, thus raising the
‘reputational costs of failing to achieve one’s NDC’.”50
An example of the effect of naming and shaming is President Trump’s decision to
withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Climate Agreement in June 2017. Upon announcing U.S.

47

Ibid.
Hunter, Ji, and Ruddock, “The Paris Agreement and Global Climate Litigation.”
49
Lawrence and Wong, “Soft Law in the Paris Climate Agreement,” 280.
50
Ibid, 284.
48
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withdrawal, President Trump immediately drew international criticism, particularly from U.S.
allies at the forefront of fighting climate change, such as French President Emmanuel Macron
and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.51 Diplomatic repercussions were severe, with
France, Canada, and Mexico threatening to impose a carbon tax on the U.S., a broader global
push to impose sanctions on the U.S., and diplomatic ostracization at the G20.52 The
consequences extended to the domestic sphere, as President Trump drew criticism from business
and industry leaders, as well as Democratic politicians.53 Furthermore, the decision to withdraw
prompted many state and local leaders, some in the private sector, Native American tribes, and
universities to declare their intention to continue upholding the Paris Climate Agreement despite
U.S. withdrawal.54 In summation, non-compliance with—and withdrawal from—the Paris
Climate Agreement carries real political and diplomatic consequences that, according to Clark,
“may range from naming and shaming pressure to loss of diplomatic goodwill, or even to
economic sanctions that could provoke a trade war.”55
Finally, another component of enforcement in the Paris Climate Agreement is its
implications in terms of international customary law. Because of the near-universal participation
in the treaty, the complied-with portions of it act not just as treaty law but also as customary law
on any state that has not consistently objected to it. The Paris Climate Agreement acts in addition
to the customary law principle of “do no harm,” which was established in the 1941 Trail Smelter
Arbitration between the U.S. and Canada.56 The do no harm principle mandates that states retain
sovereignty over their territory, but cannot right use their territory in such a way that harms other

51

Clark, “The Paris Agreement,” 127.
Ibid, 128.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid, 129.
55
Ibid.
56
Hunter, Ji, and Ruddock, “The Paris Agreement and Global Climate Litigation,” 240.
52
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states’ environments. 57 The Paris Agreement as customary law acts in conjunction with the do no
harm principle, applying it to climate change specifically.
The power of the Paris Climate Agreement as customary law is clarified when applied to
the example of U.S. withdrawal under President Trump. Despite the withdrawal from Paris, the
history of U.S. participation does not constitute consistent objection, meaning that Paris applies
to the U.S. as customary law whether or not the U.S. signed or ratified the treaty itself.58 This is
all the more true as the U.S. was involved in the case that established the do no harm principle,
accusing Canada of violating U.S. sovereignty by damaging their environment. Additionally, the
U.S. recognizes customary law as essentially binding, with the Supreme Court once holding that
“international law is part of our law”—including customary international law.59

Conclusion
The Paris Climate Agreement is an effective international environmental treaty because it
prioritized participation, established a global standard for greenhouse gas emissions reductions,
and instituted accountability systems that serve as effective enforcement. While the soft law in
the Paris Climate Agreement lacks stringent obligations for states party, it creates a procedure for
obligations to increase over time and, by increasing participation, fuels and produces the political
momentum required to compel countries to implement climate change-combatting policies.
Furthermore, by producing parallel customary international law, Paris forces universal
participation and accountability, regardless of ratification or signatory status. Above all other
criteria, participation is the most important, as the monumental issue of climate change cuts
across national, cultural, and geographic boundaries, and all states must be on board in order to
57

Ibid.
Ibid, 242.
59
Clark, “The Paris Agreement,” 125.
58
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reduce greenhouse gas emissions to a sufficient level to prevent the worst consequences of
climate change.
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